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Nikolaj Petersen
The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of
Amsterdam
On May 28, 1998, the Danish people approved the Amsterdam Treaty in a
referendum by 55.1 per cent of the vote. This was the fifth referendum on
Europe since 1972, and more referenda may be in the offing over the next
few years. This raises several questions, which this paper tries to answer:
Why do referenda play such a major role in the Danish decision system
concerning Europe? What is the particular role of referenda in the
formulation of Denmark’s EU policy? And what explains the outcome of
the recent referendum?
The constitutional requirement for referendums on the European Union is
rooted in Article 20 of the 1953 Constitution which stipulates that powers
vested in the authorities of the Realm may, to a specified extent, be
delegated by statute to international authorities set up with other states for
the promotion of international cooperation. To enact such a transfer of
sovereignty, a majority of five-sixths of the members of the Folketing, i.e.
150 out of 179 M.P.s, shall vote in favour of the bill. If this majority is not
obtained, but only a simple majority, the question shall be submitted to the
electorate for approval or rejection in accordance with the rules for
referenda laid down in Article 42 of the Constitution. This Article decides
that for the Bill to be rejected, a majority of the voters, representing not less
than thirty per cent of the electorate, must have voted against the Bill.
The background to these constitutional stipulations was the wish in 1953 to
ease Denmark’s participation in international supra-national cooperations,
such as the nascent European integration process. The alternative would beNikolaj Petersen
4
to revise the Constitution in pace with international needs, but this process
is even more cumbersome than the referendum procedure.
1
The basic condition for evading a referendum on treaty revisions, which
entails the delegation of powers, i.e. the transfer of sovereignty to the EU,
is thus a five-sixths majority of all members of the Folketing, a condition
which has only been obtained once. This was in 1993, but then a
referendum was held for a different reason. In all other cases the majority
has been less than required, and referenda have thus been constitutionally
necessary.
Apart from this constitutional aspect, referenda have also gradually become
part and parcel of the Danish political culture, so that people now feel they
have a right to be consulted on EU treaty revisions.
This is partially because referenda have occasionally been held in order to
insulate EU questions from domestic politics. Thus, the first referendum (in
1972) was proposed one year earlier to avoid getting the EC issue mixed up
in the 1971 parliamentary election. Since then, referenda have served the
purpose of insulating the EU issue from domestic politics, thereby creating
a special decision-making regime for EU affairs.
2 This interest in insulating
the EU from domestic policy is especially strong in those political parties,
which are internally divided over the EU. This goes particularly for the
Social Democratic party with its deep cleavage between its rank and file;
the party leadership is entirely pro-European, while the voters are about
evenly divided between supporters and sceptics.
Another case of domestic politics intruding on European politics was in
1986, when the Single European Act was defeated - mostly for domestic
politics reasons - in Parliament by a coalition of Social Democrats, Social
                                        
1 A revision of the Constitution requires passage of a Constitutional Bill by two
successive parliaments with a general election in between, whereafter the Bill will
have to be ratified by referendum with at least 40 per cent of the electorate voting in
favour.
2 On the Danish EU system in general, see Niels-Jørgen Nehring, “The Illusory Quest
for Legitimacy: Danish Procedures for Policy Making on the EU and the Impact of a
Critical Public”, in Georg Sørensen & Hans-Henrik Holm (eds.), And Now What?
International Politics After the Cold War, Aarhus: Politica, 1998, pp. 60-81.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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Liberals and left-wing parties. In order to escape this defeat, the
Government called for and won an advisory referendum. As a
consequence, the Folketing later ratified the SEA. These episodes have
served to institutionalize referenda as part of a special EU decision regime.
This institutionalization was further strengthened before the 1993
referendum, when it was explicitly and officially stated that the four
exemptions from Maastricht, which Denmark obtained as part of the so-
called Edinburgh decision, could only be waived after a special referendum
in each particular case.
Danish referenda and public opinion on EU 1973-93
The first Danish EC referendum took place in October 1972 before
Denmark joined the European Community. Until the year before, public
opinion was overwhelmingly for membership, but then support started to
drop and resistance began to build up. On referendum day, October 2,
1972, 63.3 percent voted in favour and 36.7 per cent against membership.
At the time the Socialist People’s Party (SF) was the only party in the
Danish Folketing, which opposed membership, but there was also some
opposition in the Social Democratic parliamentary group. Amongst voters
only the People’s Socialists had a majority against membership (ca. 80
percent), but nearly 40 percent of the Social Democratic voters also voted
against. The referendum campaign was dominated by two issues: economic
welfare and sovereignty. While the supporters mainly argued in terms of
expected economic benefits from joining and losses from standing outside,
the opponents focused heavily on the negative consequences for Denmark’s
sovereignty and independence. Thus, from the very beginning supporters of
the European project presented it in economically pragmatic, rather than in
political terms - a fact which is often deplored for having given a false start
to the European debate in Denmark from which it still suffers.
While public opinion proved favourable to the EC in the 1972 referendum,
it soon turned sour. From 1974 to 1979 the public was about evenly divided
over the question whether Denmark should remain in or leave the EC, but
from that time support dropped even further. Gallup polls from 1979 toNikolaj Petersen
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1984 showed an average of only 34 per cent supporters and 44 per cent
opponents of Denmark’s membership, cf. Figure 1. Comparative European
opinion polls at the time also showed the Danish public to score
significantly lower on European integration than other EU countries,
Britain excepted.
This was the general public opinion atmosphere, in which the SEA was
negotiated. The Schlüter government therefore took a calculated risk, when
it called for an advisory referendum in February 1986 after the defeat of the
SEA in the Folketing, the more so as both the Social Democrats and the
Social Liberals now joined the left-wing parties in advocating a “no”. But
the opposition parties did so with varying arguments and with varying
conviction, as the defeat of the SEA had to a large extent been motivated
by domestic politics concerns. As it were, the government succeeded in
capturing the agenda with its argument, that Denmark’s very membership
in the EU, and not just the SEA, was at stake. And it pulled to trick by
convincing a majority of 56.2 percent against 43.8 percent to vote for the
Single European Act.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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Figure 1. Attitudes to Membership 1972-97
Q: If you were to vote for Danish membership of the EF/EU today, would you
 vote for or against Danish membership?
Note: Against polls in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1995, 1996.
Sources:Gallup Research Institute for Berlingske Tidende, compiled in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook
1998, Copenhagen; DUPI, 1998, p. 157.
The 1986 referendum was a major setback to the parties who had voted
down the SEA in the first instance, and they reacted by gradually edging
towards more pro-EC policies. By 1990 the Social Democrats and the
Social Liberals adopted clearly pro-EC postures; in this they were also
inspired by recent European developments, the unification of Germany in
particular. Even the People’s Socialists started to take a more pragmatic
stance on EC issues, shifting from opposition to membership per se to
efforts to influence policy decisions and avoid moves towards further
integration.Nikolaj Petersen
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In public opinion, the membership issue also disappeared as the main issue.
Beginning in 1986 supporters of membership started to outnumber
opponents, and in October 1991, two months before Maastricht was
finalized, 63 per cent pro-EC voters faced only 19 per cent opponents.
Public opinion had shifted definitely in favour of the EC - or so it seemed,
cf. Figure 1.
At the political level a broad consensus was established in 1990-91 over the
Maastricht process between the government parties (Conservatives,
Liberals and Social Liberals) and the Social Democratic Party which had
by now shed many of its former reservations towards a political union. The
Maastricht Treaty proved generally acceptable to the Conservative-Liberal
government of the day, and the Social Democrats were also in favour,
though less enthusiastically than the Government parties. Their original
concerns over the Economic and Monetary Union were alleviated after
Denmark had secured the right to defer its decision on whether to join the
third stage of the EMU or not; worries over the defence aspects of the
Union were stilled by the consideration that in a few years’ time neutral
countries like Sweden and Finland would become EU members. On this
background the Folketing voted overwhelmingly (130 to 25) for the
Maastricht Treaty in the spring of 1992, with only the leftist Socialist
People’s Party and the rightist Progress Party voting against.
Then came the referendum of June 2, 1992, which rejected the Maastricht
Treaty by a slim, but still decisive margin of 50.7 percent against 49.3
percent. This result came as a complete surprise. “Yes” and “no” votes had
been rather evenly balanced during most of the campaign, i.e. from the
beginning of March until 2 weeks before the referendum, but then the “yes”
side seemed to gain the upper hand, and on the eve of the referendum
Gallup predicted a five-six percent victory for the “yes” side.
3
Subsequent analyses ascribed many causes to the defeat. The single most
decisive factor for the outcome was, that Social Democratic voters had
                                        
3 See Hans Jørgen Nielsen, EF på valg, Copenhagen: Columbus, 1993, p. 44.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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voted massively, by about two-thirds, against the Treaty.
4 Aside from the
traditional EC-scepticism among Social Democrats two specific reasons
probably accounted for this heavy “no” vote, which contrasted with the
unanimous support for Maastricht in the party’s Parliamentary group. The
party had gone through a traumatic leadership crisis immediately before the
referendum, when Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the present Prime Minister,
ousted Svend Auken as party chairman; as a result the party organization’s
attention was directed inwards and its activists were demoralised.
Therefore the Social Democratic election machine did not work with its
usual efficiency.
Another explanation focused upon the frustrations of the Social Democratic
rank and file after almost 10 years in opposition - frustrations which found
an easy target in the high pro-European profile of Foreign Minister Uffe
Ellemann-Jensen (Lib.). Many Social Democratic voters probably voted
against Maastricht because they saw it as a bourgeois scheme, promoted by
a controversial, even provocative Foreign Minister.
Whatever the reason for the defeat, political attention had to be directed
towards how to manage this. Two days after the referendum the European
Council, at its meeting in Oslo, ruled out any re-negotiation of the Treaty
itself and declared the member countries’ intention of going ahead despite
the Danish “no”. Attention was consequently directed towards creating a
new and more acceptable framework for Denmark’s ratification of the
Treaty. In this process the Government’s preference was to sit tight, hoping
for a favourable development which would somehow allow it to have the
Maastricht Treaty ratified in its entirety. However, the Social Democrats,
together with a majority in the Folketing, demanded significant revisions in
the form of Danish exemptions from the Treaty, which would make it
acceptable to the public in another referendum round. But which revisions?
It belongs to the logic of a referendum that reasons for the vote are not
given. Therefore the politicians had to rely on opinion polls as well as the
official “no” arguments in order to determine, which aspects of Maastricht
                                        
4 Ibid., p. 55 (67 percent); Karen Siune, Palle Svensson & Ole Tonsgaard, - det blev et
nej, Aarhus, Politica, 1992, p. 71 (64 percent).Nikolaj Petersen
10
had been especially unpalatable to the public. Polls indicated that the
common foreign policy, the common defence as well as the common
currency and the common European citizenship were unpopular with the
voters.
5 Another indication lay in the specific demands for re-negotiation
which the Socialist People’s Party had presented before the referendum;
these focused on the third phase of the EMU, on defence cooperation, on
supra-national decision on justice and home affairs (JHA) and on union
citizenship as candidates for exemptions.
These four elements came to constitute the so-called “National
Compromise”, which was agreed between the opposition parties, including
the People’s Socialists, and which the government had to accept in October
1992. The Compromise was subsequently presented to Denmark’s EC
partners on an almost take-it-or-leave-it basis, and in December 1992 the
Government succeeded in having the four demands of the National
Compromise accepted by the European Council in the so-called Edinburgh
Decision. Besides exemptions for Denmark the Decision also included
formulations on subsidiarity and openness, which had been demanded in
the National Compromise.
Thus a new basis for Denmark’s participation in the European Union was
found. It included the following four exemptions from the Union:
1. Denmark would not take part in the third phase of the Economic and
Monetary Union;
2. Denmark would not become a member of (only an observer in) the
Western European Union and would not participate in decisions under
the Common Foreign and Security Policy with defence implications;
3. Denmark would not accept a future transfer of parts of Pillar 3 (Justice
and Home Affairs) to the supra-national Pillar I;
4. Denmark would not be bound by the union citizenship (although it
would give EU citizens all the stipulated rights in Denmark).
As a quid pro quo Denmark promised not to prevent the other members
from developing their cooperation in the exempted areas.
                                        
5 Cf. Siune, et al., p. 74.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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The new framework for Maastricht was presented to the public in another
referendum on May 18, 1993. Many factors pointed towards a “yes” vote
this time. First, the Edinburgh Decision gave significant concessions to the
sceptical voters, even though opposition groups continued to argue that the
exemptions were illusory, and that even with Edinburgh, Denmark risked
sliding further down the slippery slope to European Union. Secondly, the
Edinburgh exemptions were cemented by the enactment of a stipulation
that none of them could be repealed without a previous ratification in yet
another referendum. Thirdly, the Social Democrats had taken over
government (together with two coalition partners) in January 1993, thus
strengthening its appeal to its doubting voters. And finally, the Socialist
People’s Party as party to the National Compromise was now on the “yes”
side, leaving parliamentary opposition to the rightist-populist Progress
Party.
As predicted, the May referendum ratified the Maastricht-cum-Edinburgh
framework, by a significant, though not quite convincing majority of 56.7
percent to 43.3 percent. An important contribution to this result was an
increase in the Social Democratic “yes” vote compared to 1992. But even
so the party remained split with one half voting in favour, the other half
voting against, despite the united “yes” appeal of the party leadership.
6 On
the other hand, the Socialist People’s Party spectacularly failed to convince
its voters of its new positive attitude; more than five-sixths of the voters
continued to vote “no”.
7 Other indicators show that the increase in support
between 1992 and 1993 mainly took place amongst workers and low-
income and low-education groups, i.e. those groups which normally vote
for the Social Democrats.
8
                                        
6 See Nielsen, op.cit., p. 50 (50 percent for) and Karen Siune, Palle Svensson & Ole
Tonsgaard, - fra et nej til et ja, Aarhus: Politica, 1994, p. 101 (also 50 percent for).
7 Nielsen, op.cit., p. 55 (85 percent against); Siune et al. (1994), p. 101 (87 percent
against). As a consequence, the party leadership slowly veered back to a negative
posture to the EU over the next few years.
8 Nielsen, op.cit., p. 57.Nikolaj Petersen
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Denmark and the Inter-Governmental Conference 1996-97
The traumatic Maastricht experience has cast long shadows over
Denmark’s European policy since then. Politicians tend to tread extremely
carefully in European questions in order not to challenge the EU-sceptical
segments amongst the public. In this process the four Edinburgh
exemptions have acquired an almost sacrosanct quality - being jealously
guarded by the People’s Socialists and effectively protected by the Social
Democrats. On the other hand, the main opposition parties since 1993, i.e.
the Liberals and the Conservatives, have vowed to remove the Edinburgh
exemptions as soon as possible. The problem though, is with public
opinion. Polls since 1993 have regularly shown a majority for upholding
the exemptions, cf. Figure 2, which shows a development in attitudes
towards the EMU exemption since 1993; data on the other exemption are
quite similar.
Figure 2. Attitudes to the EMU Exemption 1993-97The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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This is hardly an inviting background for calling new referenda, and
gradually Danish politicians have come to agree that a referendum on the
exemptions should only be called in a situation, where a majority seems
guaranteed beforehand. Such a situation is not yet in sight.
The politicians’ reluctance to try the public on the Edinburgh exemptions
illustrates the extreme caution with which they approach the public over
European Union affairs. This became very clear with the 1996 Inter-
Governmental Conference and the prospect of having to send another treaty
revision for public ratification. The Government would undoubtedly have
preferred to be without the 1996 IGC, because despite the Prime Minister’s
protestations before and during the IGC, it was an almost foregone
conclusion that there would have to be a referendum at the end of the
Conference - provided, of course, a positive result was attained. This
indicated a very cautious, status quo-oriented Danish stance at the 1996
IGC.
In the Government’s perspective there were, however, also some
redeeming aspects to the IGC. While it raised the spectre of ratification
trouble, it also offered the prospect of an enlargement of the Union with
new members in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1993, when the Danish
Government secured the first green light for Eastern enlargement at the EU
Copenhagen Summit, enlargement had been on top of the Government’s
EU agenda. This enlargement prospect induced the Government to adopt a
more positive attitude towards institutional change than usual - but with no
guarantee that this would eventually curry favour with the public.
As IGC 1996 approached, the government had to think of a strategy for
preparing the public and ensuring that the Maastricht debacle would not be
repeated. This created a serious dilemma. On one hand, the Government
realized, that the public debate had come too late in 1992, when it only
started after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed; it was therefore aware
that public opinion had to be taken into account from the very beginning of
preparations for the IGC.
On the other hand, given the basic scepticism of the public and the
existence of well-organized anti-Unionist movements, the governmentNikolaj Petersen
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could realistically fear that a public debate before the IGC might spin out of
control and leave the Government with a severely restricted freedom of
maneuvre at the Conference. The result was kind of a compromise: The
Government started to spread information earl on about the issues of the
conference, primarily through pamphlets issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, but holding somewhat back on starting a general debate -
especially within the major government party, the Social Democrats. An
important step was the publication in June 1995, concurrently with the start
of the so-called Reflection Group, of an official booklet, Dagsorden for
Europa
9, which gave a thorough background to the conference and the
issues expected to dominate it. In this phase the dominant public opinion
strategy was thus an information strategy. At this time, i.e. 1995, most
political parties also published their bids for IGC 1996.
Before the 1991 Inter-Governmental Conference the major government and
opposition parties, excluding the People’s Socialists and the rightist
Progress Party, had agreed on a joint negotiating platform. This was also
what the non-socialist opposition parties expected or hoped for before IGC
1996. But now the Socialist People’s Party had entered the scene as a party
to the National Compromise of 1992 and as the self-appointed guardian of
the Edinburgh exemptions. For this reason, and also because the Social
Democratic left-wing tends to agree more with the People’s Socialists than
with their own leadership on European affairs, the Government was eager
to keep the People’s Socialists within the European consensus, so to speak.
However, since 1993 this party’s leadership had got increasingly cold feet
over its association with the pro-Unionist side, and by late 1995 it was clear
that the party was not willing to renew the National Compromise on terms
acceptable to the other parties.
Efforts to keep the People’s Socialists onboard therefore failed, but in order
not to further estrange the left-wing, the Government declined to negotiate
a common platform with the non-socialistic parties and instead worked out
its own platform. The latter parties could be expected to vote for the
                                        
9 Udenrigsministeriet, Dagsorden for Europa. Regeringskonference 1996, Copenhagen
1995.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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outcome of IGC 1996 anyway, so the Government concentrated on keeping
open the possibility of the People’s Socialists voting for the negotiation
result or, alternatively, making a “no” on their part as costly as possible.
In December 1995 the Government then published its own platform which
was heavily predicated on the enlargement of the Union.
10 According to the
platform, the IGC should “primarily create the foundation for the
enlargement of the EU with the Central and East European countries,
including the Baltic countries.” The platform consisted of a mixture of
defensive and offensive elements. On the defensive side it firmly stated that
the four Edinburgh exemptions were non-negotiable at the IGC and that
they could only be repealed by another referendum. But there were strongly
offensive aspects as well on issues like employment, the environment, and
consumer protection. In these areas the Government wanted more Union,
that is stronger provisions. These proposals were to a large extent
motivated by the perceived need for the EU to address the concrete
concerns of ordinary people, so as to reduce the distance between them and
the Union. This concern for public opinion also lay behind other offensive
aspects of the platform, for instance when it pleaded for increased openness
and for a strengthening of the subsidiarity principle.
The platform was more guarded on institutional matters and Pillars II
(Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP) and III (Justice and Home
Affairs - JHA), i.e. those issues where the public was supposed to be
sceptical. The platform did acknowledge, though, that a major enlargement
of the Union would require some strengthening of its decision-making
procedures. In fact, in a cautious way the platform was open to some
institutional reform, such as more majority voting and fewer and simpler
cooperation procedures between the Council, the Commission and the
Parliament. The platform was very adamant on one point, namely that each
member-state should continue to have at least one Commissioner.
On CFSP, which Denmark traditionally sees as strictly inter-governmental,
there were some openings as well, as the platform accepted the principle of
                                        
10 “Det åbne Europa: Regeringskonferencen 1996”, reprinted in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk
Årbog 1995, Copenhagen: DUPI, 1996, pp. 287-94.Nikolaj Petersen
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constructive abstension by one or two countries. It was also open to the
proposal that the EU might take on humanitarian actions, crisis
management and peace-keeping operations, even though it made clear that
because of its exemption Denmark would not take part in any such actions
herself. Concerning JHA the government platform emphasized the need for
strengthening existing procedures, but also for keeping them strictly inter-
governmental in accordance with the relevant Edinburgh exemption.
In its preparation for IGC 1996 the Government thus had three goals in
mind:
1. to maximise the chances of winning the referendum;
2. to improve the chances of EU enlargement; and
3. to change the EU according to Danish preferences.
Of these goals, the first one was probably the dominant one, even though
the government did venture into some potentially dangerous terrain by its
willingness to accept some institutional consequences of enlargement. To
ensure public support, the Government adopted a reassuring strategy in
defence of the Edinburgh exemptions. There is little doubt, that most
Government members would have preferred to do without the exemptions,
but a demonstrated willingness to give them up, as advocated by the non-
socialist parties, would have weakened its position vis-à-vis its own voters
and jeopardized any chance of keeping the People’s Socialists committed
to the National Compromise. So the Government’s position became, in a
formula that was repeated time and again, that “the exemptions stand -
before, during and after the IGC”.
Denmark during the Inter-Governmental Conference
The analysis of Denmark’s strategies during the Inter-Governmental
Conference must necessarily rest on a somewhat shaky foundation. The
Government continued its information strategy during the conference by
publishing three additional pamphlets during the Conference, all of themThe Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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emphasizing in their titles the Danish quest for “an open Europe”.
11 These
pamphlets provided general information on the Conference, including the
texts of the Danish proposals.
As indicated by its platform the Government adopted an offensive strategy
in the negotiation of certain issues at the Conference.
12 Thus, it presented
specific and very detailed proposals on a range of issues, such as
employment, environment, openness, consumer protection, the fight against
fraud, and subsidiarity.
13
On employment it was argued that the main effort should continue to be
made at the national level, but that supplementary EU measures were also
required. The Danish Government particularly proposed to include a
special employment title in the Treaty, which should strengthen the
objective of high employment and emphasize employment as a joint
responsibility calling for coordinated effort.
On this issue Denmark was on line with (but also in rivalry with) Sweden,
while Germany, France and the United Kingdom for a long time were
opposed to including employment among the EU’s mandated tasks.
However, after elections in Spring 1997 had brought a shift of power in
Paris and London, Germany was increasingly isolated and finally gave up
its resistance. The negotiating result, which to a large extent mirrored the
original Danish proposals, was only reached at the final Amsterdam
Summit and after a very energetic effort by Prime Minister Poul Nyrup
Rasmussen.
Another favourite topic of the Government was the environment, where it
also presented detailed proposals. These focused on
                                        
11 Udenrigsministeriet, På vej mod det åbne Europa (1996); Tæt på det åbne Europa
(1997), and Det Åbne Europa (1997).
12 For an analysis of Danish strategies during IGC 1996, see Nikolaj Petersen,
“Denmark, the IGC 1996 and the Future of the European Union”, in Bertel Heurlin
& Hans Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998, Copenhagen:
DUPI, 1998, pp. 43-59.
13 These proposals are reproduced in Udenrigsministeriet, Tæt på det åbne Europa,
1997, pp. 27-53.Nikolaj Petersen
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1. the integration of the goal of environmentally sustainable development
in the preamble of the TEU,
2. the integration of environmental concerns in concrete policies (e.g.
agriculture and transport),
3. the integration of environmental concerns in internal market policies,
including an improved environmental guarantee (Art. 100A, pt. 4), and
4. qualified majority voting on certain environmental levies.
The Danish environmental posture was highly ambitious, but important
positions were shared with the other Nordic countries and with Germany,
Austria and the Netherlands; Spain represented the other extreme. Again,
the Danish approach was an offensive one with Prime Minister Nyrup
Rasmussen taking a very active part in the final round of discussions.
Significant parts of the Danish proposals were actually included in the
Treaty, although the environmental guarantee (Art. 100A) was weaker than
hoped for.
Somewhat less progress was registered concerning the remaining Danish
pet projects; in particular, there was a tough battle on openness. Some
progress was obtained, though, as the principle of openness was written
into the Treaty (TEU, Article 1 (A)).
In conclusion, the strongly offensive strategies adopted on certain issues
proved highly effective, and on balance Denmark gained as much - or
rather more - on these issues as could have been hoped for before the
Conference.
While the Danish Government was on the offensive on some issues it was
defensive on others, but for the same reason: the wish to improve the public
acceptance of the revised Treaty. This defensive stance applied in particular
to the four exemptions. However, during most of the negotiations Denmark
played a kind of waiting game, keeping the issue of a continuation of the
exemptions theoretically open until the very last minute. In fact, the
confirmation of the Danish exemptions did not take place until the final
Amsterdam negotiation. There a protocol, which took care of two of
Denmark’s exemptions, was agreed. Of the remaining two exemptions one,
union citizenship, was directly inscribed in the Treaty without further adoThe Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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(TEC, Art. 8), while the other one, on the EMU, was never relevant to the
Conference.
The reason for this waiting game was not uncertainty, on whether the
exemptions could or should be upheld. Aside from a single episode,
14 it
seems that the Government was convinced all the way, that they must be
upheld at practically any cost if the final result were to be accepted by the
public. That is, the Government was prepared for a tough struggle to secure
the exemptions, if needed. The reason for the waiting game was rather to
maintain maximum influence over those questions which were covered by
the exemptions; as long as Denmark had not proclaimed itself definitively,
it could take full part in the discussions and influence their course.
As a matter of fact, Denmark succeeded in having at least some influence
over the formulation of issues concerned with Justice and Home Affairs.
For instance, in Article TEC 73K the Danish negotiators succeeded in
inserting the notion of minimum standards for the treatment of asylum
seekers, refugees, third country nationals and others. This was not without
a certain irony, because in the end these provisions did not come to bind
Denmark itself.
The Danish negotiators for a long time hoped to avoid any transfer of
matters from Pillar III to Pillar I, that is from inter-governmentalism to
supra-nationalism, because this would trigger the Edinburgh exemption
over Justice and Home Affairs. This did not succeed because of German
insistence, and consequently Denmark had to demand an updated
exemption. This fell into place at the very last moment, but without any
serious resistance; in fact, the Protocol which exempts Denmark from part
of the new so-called “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, was largely
written by the Danish negotiators. It proved unnecessary to man the
barricades, so to speak.
The Danish Protocol covers two questions: border control with related
questions and defence. With respect to defence policy nothing much
                                        
14 During the Spring of 1997 some uncertainty arose, when Minister of the Interior
Birthe Weiss hinted that the exemption on the Third Pillar might have to be given up,
but after a while the hole in the negotiation armour was closed again.Nikolaj Petersen
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changed in the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Protocol could therefore be
confined to reiterating the Edinburgh language.
On the other hand, significant changes occurred in Amsterdam which
affected the Edinburgh exemption on JHA. As mentioned, the essence of
this exemption was an objection to the future transfer of parts of Pillar III
to Pillar I. This transfer actually happened, which meant that the sleeping
exemption was suddenly triggered. The Protocol gives Denmark a blanket
exemption from all EU decisions concerning border controls, asylum
policy, immigration, etc., which are taken within Pillar I.
15 In these issues
Denmark is free to formulate her own national policy, if she so chooses. To
what extent Denmark will be able or willing to conduct a policy at odds
with the common EU policies on immigration, asylum, etc., is another
question, though.
In one area special problems are likely to arise, namely with respect to the
Schengen rules for border passage. This is so, because Denmark (together
with other members of the Nordic Passport Union) will become a party to
Schengen in the year 2000, and because Schengen will be integrated in the
Union via the Amsterdam Treaty. In order to remain in Schengen and the
old Nordic Passport Union, which will become part of Schengen, the
Treaty stipulates that Denmark will have to react within a six-month period
to future Schengen decisions taken by supra-national procedures which
Denmark does not take part in. This may happen either by adopting the
Schengen rule as national law or by negotiating special arrangements with
the other members of the Union.
Thus, by and large, Denmark’s defensive strategies at IGC 1996 succeeded
in guarding and even widening the Edinburgh exemptions. As a result it
can be claimed, that Denmark will now be more of an “odd man out”
16 in
European integration than before Amsterdam, mainly because the sleeping
                                        
15 In practice, Denmark can take part in negotiations in the Council over these issues,
but will not take part in the decision itself and will not be bound by it.
16 See Birgit Nüchel Thomsen (ed.), The Odd Man Out. Danmark og den Europæiske
integration 1948-1992, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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exemption on border control issues will be activated when Amsterdam is in
place.
Finally, one could point out some issues where Denmark was willing,
before IGC 1996, to give some limited concessions to the Union process in
order to facilitate enlargement. These areas mostly concerned the Common
Foreign and Security Policy and institutional changes. On both issues, the
Danish willingness to concede was never really tested because
disagreements among the other delegations resulted in only limited
changes. In most cases Denmark could seek cover behind Britain’s status
quo policies, and in the final Amsterdam phase German reluctance to speed
up integration saved Denmark from some difficult choices.
The Amsterdam decisions on CFSP hardly went beyond what the Danish
Government was prepared to accept in the first place. The decision to
establish a special planning and warning unit in the Secretariat-General of
the Council was welcomed, even though the inclusion of WEU personnel
in it was hardly to the Danish taste. The nomination of a High
Representative, a “Mr./Ms. CFSP”, to give the common policies greater
external visibility and penetration was equally acceptable; in particular it
was appreciated that the High Representative would be working under the
instructions of the Council and the Presidency.
Another new element was the introduction of constructive abstension as a
kind of flexibility measure for Pillar II. In its IGC platform the Government
had been ready to accept “consensus minus one (or two)”. In Amsterdam it
accepted the possibility of up to one-third of weighted votes abstaining, but
this did not constitute a serious problem. The small opening for qualified
majority voting in CFSP was hardly to Denmark’s liking, but the opening
was so small and theoretical, that no serious practical consequences were
foreseen. The minor changes in the CFSP thus did not conjure up any real
problems for Denmark, as long as the exemption concerning participation
in defence policy was respected. There is no indication that it proved
difficult to secure this exemption.
Institutional questions normally constitute the lithmus test of Denmark’s
attitude to the integration process. The traditional position has been that theNikolaj Petersen
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existing institutional balance should not be disturbed, meaning that the
powers of the Commission and Parliament should not be increased at the
expense of the Council. This was also the basic position before IGC 1996.
Another such position was that of a unchanged balance between small and
large member countries. In practise however, the Danish attitude was quite
flexible on both counts.
During the Conference the limits of Danish flexibility were hardly tested.
The co-decision procedure was extended and replaced the cooperation
procedure, leading to a considerable indirect strengthening of the
Parliament, but these changes had already been foreseen in the Danish IGC
platform. So was the extended use of qualified majority voting, where
Denmark was willing to go further than was actually agreed.
For a number of reasons the institutional changes in Amsterdam were
moderate and on balance, somewhat insufficient to guarantee what was a
Danish top priority, namely laying a firm foundation for the enlargement of
the Union with all applicant countries. In fact, only a first enlargement with
five countries was prepared. Denmark would have been willing to go
further in Amsterdam, not only by accepting a double majority, but
probably also a certain readjustment of votes in the Council between small
and large member countries.
While it was satisfactory from a Danish point of view that the balance
between large and small members was not tampered with after all, the end
result could hardly be viewed as entirely satisfactory. Denmark received no
guarantee that an institutional solution will be found in due time to allow
the admission of the less prepared and less desirable applicants in the
second eschelon. Since Amsterdam Denmark has worked hard and to some
extent successfully to blunt the distinction between the first and second
eschelon, but the institutional barrier to enlargement beyond the 20-
member mark still stands.
By and large IGC 1996 proved less of an ordeal than the Danish
Government may have feared on beforehand. This was mainly due to three
factors. First, as the Reflection Group’s discussions had revealed, there
were widely diverging opinions among the participants in the Conference,The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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which directed it towards solutions at the lowest common denominator.
Secondly, the pressure for a significant deepening of cooperation proved to
be weak. This was both a general reaction to the difficulties which
Maastricht has caused, but also reflected the fact that countries like the
Netherlands and, in particular, Germany did not provide the usual
momentum. In the final phase, German Chancellor Kohl applied the break
rather than pressing the accelerator. The third reason was that the
Conference shied away from tackling in depth the question of institutional
adaptation to large-scale enlargement.
The Referendum Campaign
Having secured a relatively acceptable Treaty the Government now faced
to problem of public acceptance. Referendum day, May 28, 1998, was
decided on early, but the campaign only warmed up slowly, perhaps in the
fear of running out of steam before the referendum. Then in the spring of
1998 the campaign came up against a set of partially unexpected obstacles.
First,in Feburary the Government called for a snap election on March 11, in
which the government of Social Democrats and Social Liberals only
narrowly preserved its majority. In the aftermath its position was
strengthened by internal troubles among the non-socialist parties, though.
The Liberal leader, former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen - easily
the most high-profiled Danish pro-European - stepped down after having
failed to become the new Prime Minister and announced his departure from
politics after the referendum. And the Conservative Party, which suffered a
major defeat in the election, tottered on the brink of internal dissolution.
One reason for the Government to call the election in March was to avoid
having it mixed up with the referendum campaign,
17 and in this it
succeeded to a large extent. As it turned out, the EU question had little
impact on the election result. The left-wing anti-Unionist parties weakened
marginally, while a new rightlist party, the Danish People’s Party, entered
                                        
17 Constitutionally the government had to call an election in September 1998 at the
latest.Nikolaj Petersen
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the Folketing on a platform of opposition to immigrants and the EU. The
party did very well, but to some extent at the expense of the Progress Party,
its parent party. Among the non-socialist pro-European parties the high-
profiled Liberals gained nothing, while the Conservatives were heavily
defeated, and the Center Democrats gained somewhat.
Before the referendum campaign could really get re-started after the
elections, another hurdle had to be passed, namely a Supreme Court ruling
on the Maastricht Treaty. Back in 1993 a group of citizens had sued Prime
Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen for violating the Danish Constitution by
signing the Maastricht Treaty. Their main argument was that Maastricht
delegated un-specified powers to the Union, not specified powers as
required by Art. 20 of the Constitution (see above). They also referred to
Art. 235 of the TEC and to the practises of the European Court of Justice to
make their point that Denmark had given up open-ended powers to the
European Union.
In 1994 the case was rejected by the High Court for the reason that the
plaintiffs could not demonstrate a concrete personal interest in the case. In
1996 the Supreme Court, however, reversed this ruling and allowed the
case to tried. The following year (1997) the High Court acquitted the Prime
Minister, but the ruling was immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.
The decision of the Supreme Court was announced on April 6, 1998. It did
acquit the Prime Minister, but also set certain limits to the Union process.
The ruling defined the clause “to a specified extent” to mean that a positive
delimitation must be made, both of the issue-areas and of the character of
the powers delegated. The transfer of powers need not be limited in the
sense of being small; on the other hand, powers could not be transferred to
such an extent that Denmark would no longer be an independent state. The
Supreme Court argued, that the specification requirement was fulfilled, as
the EU could only function within limits defined in the Treaty and on the
basis of powers transferred from the member states. Neither Art. 235 nor
the practices of the ECJ affected this judgement. Finally, the Supreme
Court addressed the relationship between the ECJ and the national courts. It
accepted the general prejudicial competence of the ECJ concerning all ECThe Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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legislation. However, Danish courts could never be deprived of the right to
try whether an EC law violated the limits of Denmark’s transfer of
sovereignty to the Union:
"Danish law courts must therefore consider an EC law to be
inapplicable in Denmark, if the extraordinary situation were to arise,
that it could be determined with the necessary certainty that an EC
law, which has been upheld by the European Court of Justice, rests on
a reading of the Treaty which is outside the transfer of sovereignty
according to the [Danish] Law of Accession."
18
No sooner had this judicial hurdle been passed than another obstacle
showed up. After Easter the labour rank and file unexpectedly rejected a
two-year general labour agreement which the Trade Union Congress had
negotiated with the employers’ organization. The result was a major strike
by more than 500.000 workers, which began on April 27 and soon
threatened to paralyse the country’s essential functions. This placed the
Government in a dilemma. If the strike was allowed to run its course, it
could interfere with the referendum campaign in an unpredictable way by
furthering a general left-wing mobilization. If, on the other hand, the
government intervened to stop the strike it risked to alienate those groups,
which had voted against the labour agreement, and which to a large extent
also represented traditional working-class scepticism towards the EU.
In the circumstances, the strike was allowed to run for 11 days, after which
the Government and Parliament intervened and dictated a two-year solution
which was close to the original agreement, but with a few additional
concessions to the labour side. This intervention was generally accepted by
the labour side, but some uncertainty remained whether the Government
had not jeopardized some of its credibility with the Social Democratic left-
wing.
The effective referendum campaign thus became extremely short, only 2½
weeks. The main contestants were the political parties and popular
movements like The People’s Movement against the EC Union
                                        
18 See Politiken, April 7, 1998.Nikolaj Petersen
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(Folkebevægelsen mod EF-Unionen) and the June Movement
(Junibevægelsen).
On the left the so-called Unity List (Enhedslisten) - a conglomerate of
radical leftist groupings - was staunchly and predictably opposed to the
Amsterdam Treaty, which it saw as part of the building-up of a Fortress
Europe with closed frontiers, a common police and a common army.
The major political force on the left, the Socialist People’s Party
(Socialistisk Folkeparti) was badly split over Amsterdam. Since the 1993
referendum when the party leadership failed to convince its voters to vote
for the Maastricht-cum-Edinburgh solution, the party started to veer back to
its old Euro-scepticism, and when Amsterdam came up for decision, the
party leader, Holger K. Nielsen, and a sizable majority of the party’s
activists turned against it. Their arguments were two-fold and perhaps not
entirely consistent. First, it was argued that by and large the Treaty
represented another, though minor, step towards the cementing the
European Union. Secondly, it was claimed that even though the Treaty did
represent some progress on certain points, it did not go far enough. Thus
the Party leader criticized the environmental “guarantee” as defective and
also argued that the Treaty should have gone considerably further in
preparing for enlargement. Rather than uniting Europe, the Amsterdam
Treaty threatened to split the Continent between insiders and outsiders; in
fact, the party argued that all countries who want to join the EU should be
allowed to do so as soon as they are prepared for it. The party’s main
demand, which was shared by the whole opposition to Amsterdam, was
that Denmark should step out of the Schengen agreement as well as all
cooperation at the judicial level, including the Europol.
19
                                        
19 In June 1997, just before the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, the Danish Parliament
decided to accede to the Schengen agreement. For several years Denmark had
considered its position to Schengen, because of doubts concerning its compatibility
with the Nordic Passport Union. After Sweden and Finland had joined the EU in
1995, a solution was negotiated which allowed the Nordic Passport Union to remain
within Schengen. The decision to join Schengen was heavily criticized by the left-
wing and right-wing Euro-sceptics.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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This position was somewhat weakened when it turned out that prominent
party leaders, among them the parliamentary leader and the party’s deputy
chairman, were not prepared to toe the party line, but advocated a “yes” to
Amsterdam; in fact, there was a majority for Amsterdam in the party’s
parliamentary group. The arguments of this group were mainly pragmatic:
that Amsterdam represented a step forward compared to Maastricht, and
that it was a pre-condition for enlargement.
The government parties, i.e. the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals,
argued that the Government had attained all its major goals in Amsterdam,
which was therefore a much better and much more “Danish” treaty than
Maastricht. (The Social Democrats also argued that it was a more “Social
Democratic” treaty, but this could not be the Government position, as it
was not subscribed by the Social Liberals). The government parties
emphasized that the strengthening of employment, environment and
consumer protection policies represented real progress compared to
Maastricht, but the main argument was that the Treaty was a major “peace
project” by opening the way for enlargement to the East. Another important
argument was, that the Edinburgh exemptions had been protected.
The government parties further argued that the consequences of a “no”
would be highly damaging to Danish interests. The Government warned
that a re-negotiation of Amsterdam as demanded by the opposition groups
was totally unrealistic and emphasized that there were no potential
exemptions to be made from Amsterdam as there had been with Maastricht.
The opposition parties had pointed to the possibility of resigning from
Schengen. This the Government was not prepared to accept, and it warned
that the cost of doing so could be prohibitive, e.g. the break-up of the
Nordic Passport Union and the transformation of Denmark’s borders into
external EU borders.
In the view of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Denmark’s eventual
arrangement with the EU in case of a “no” could not be foreseen; Denmark
would probably have to enter into a looser association with the EU with
less participation in European cooperation, but he clearly ruled out leavingNikolaj Petersen
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the Union entirely.
20 Another prominent government argument was that a
rejection of Amsterdam would damage the chances of an early enlargement
of the Union.
The non-socialist pro-Amsterdam parties used more or less the same
arguments as the Government, though often more explicitly. The Liberals,
especially, were outspoken in their warnings of a “no”, predicting that this
would logically lead to Denmark’s departure from the Union and to a
“Norwegian” solution; former Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen
repeatedly warned against this prospect.
21 On the positive side, the Liberals
and Center Democrats were the most outspoken in favour of Amsterdam
and the further development of European integration, while the
Conservatives and the Christian People’s Party were somewhat more
circumspect; thus the Conservatives’ slogan was: “We will work for
Europe, but fight for Denmark”.
On the right-wing, the two populist parties both conducted vigorous
campaigns against Amsterdam, though on a slightly different basis. Under
the slogan “Vote Danish - vote no” the Danish People’s Party conducted a
nationalistic campaign in continuation of its anti-foreigner election
campaign. Its main focus was on Schengen and the dangers for Denmark of
open borders, but the party also demanded that Denmark should opt out of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and that EU citizens’ political
and social rights in Denmark should be curtailed. The small Progress Party
used the same arguments, but concentrated on an anti-bureaucratic and
anti-centralistic EU-sceptical line.
Since 1972 popular movements have played important roles in EC/EU
referenda and in EP election campaigns, where they regularly gain about
one-fourth of Denmark’s EP seats. The oldest organisation, The Popular
Movement against the EC Union, conducted a clear leftist campaign
                                        
20 “Usikkerheden ved et nej”, (interview with Poul Nyrup Rasmusssen), Politiken, May
20, 1998.
21 Together with Iceland and Liechtenstein Norway is part of the European Economic
Area with the EU. This means participation in the Internal Market, but little, if any
influence on its policies.The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
29
focused on the dangers of Fortress Europe, of a common policy, of a
common defence policy and also of the erosion of national veto powers in
the Union.
The June Movement, which was established in 1992-93 as a more
pragmatic anti-Unionist movement, echoed these themes, and also
emphasized the inherent lack of democracy in the Union. The most
controversial part of its campaign was a certain populism. On the one hand
it repeated the Fortress Europe theme, but on the other it also appealed to
nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments by attacking Schengen and the
opening of Denmark’s border to the south. It thus attempted to steer an
uneasy mid-course between the leftist and rightist criticisms of the Treaty.
Finally, anti-Unionist voices were on the increase among moderate non-
Socialist voters than before. The so-called Europe of the Nations
(Nationernes Europa) argued on a traditional nation-state platform that the
Union had gone too far and had to be rolled back to take care of only those
issue-areas, where international cooperation is necessary.
The Referendum Result and its Antecedents
The referendum of May 28, 1998, gave a small, but significant victory for
the supporters of the Amsterdam Treaty and more generally for Denmark’s
continued participation in the Union as an active and (nearly) full member.
55.1 per cent voted for, while 44.9 per cent voted against. As shown in
Table 1, this was a smaller “yes”-vote than in 1993, but still well above the
vote in 1992. Turnout was very low, only 75.6 percent compared to 83.1
amend 86.9 percent in 1992 and 1993 respectively. This seemed to indicate
a certain fatigue among the electorate.
To set this result into perspective one can cite the Eurobarometer poll from
March 1998, which compares the member states on a number of issues.
The barometer shows the Danish people to be best informed of the
Amsterdam Treaty, at least at the subjective level, as 91 per cent answer
“yes” to the question “Do you know the Amsterdam Treaty?” against an
EU average of 34 per cent and 25 per cent in Germany. On the questionNikolaj Petersen
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“Are you in favour of EU membership?” Denmark also scores above the
EU average. 53 per cent declare themselves in favour, while 22 per cent are
against membership; the EU average is 49 percent for and 14 per cent
against; in Germany only 38 per cent of the population are now in favour,
while 15 percent are against.
22
Table 1. Referenda on EU questions 1972-98: Regional Distribution
Turnout Yes percentage
1992 1993 1998 1972 1986 1992 1993 1998
Denmark 83,1 86,9 75,6 63,4 56,2 49,3 56,7 55,1
Main areas:
Copenhagen 81,6 84,5 73,6 47,5 36,3 38,3 44,7 49,2
The Islands 84,6 87,5 77,2 63,9 54,9 49,6 56,5 54,6
Jutland 82,0 86,0 74,6 68,6 62,5 51,6 59,9 57,1
Copenhagen Metro-
politan Districts:
South 80,4 83,3 71,5 43,8 33,4 36,3 42,2 47,4
East 81,9 84,6 73,9 48,3 35,3 37,4 44,4 48,8
West 82,3 85,1 73,6 49,7 39,7 41,0 47,0 51,1
Island Counties:
Copenhagen 86,3 88,8 78,4 58,2 49,8 48,9 55,4 54,4
Frederiksborg 85,6 88,4 78,6 64,1 58,0 53,5 59,5 57,7
Roskilde 86,5 89,1 79,0 63,9 55,1 51,6 59,0 55,7
West Sealand 82,5 86,0 75,6 67,0 56,9 48,6 55,4 51,8
Storstrøm 83,5 86,5 77,1 68,6 56,1 48,4 55,0 51,9
Bornholm 79,4 82,9 73,1 62,6 57,3 49,3 53,0 53,0
Funen 83,0 86,1 77,2 67,5 57,6 48,1 56,2 54,6
Jutland Counties:
South Jutland 82,6 86,6 77,3 75,1 68,3 54,1 61,5 57,1
Ribe 81,2 85,9 73,9 70,9 68,1 53,7 61,3 58,1
Vejle 82,8 86,5 74,8 68,3 62,5 51,9 60,8 56,2
Ringkøbing 82,5 86,3 75,0 75,3 73,7 57,5 66,4 61,5
Århus 83,8 87,2 76,1 62,1 53,5 48,7 57,4 56,4
Viborg 81,6 85,3 74,0 74,6 67,7 53,6 62,8 59,5
North Jutland 79,2 84,4 71,7 66,3 59,5 48,7 55,9 54,5
Sources:Statistiske Efterretninger, Befolkninger og valg, 1992, no. 13 and ibid., 1993, no. 9; Morgenavisen
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Jyllands-Posten, May 29, 1998.
This demonstrates that Denmark is no longer in the absolute bottom when
it comes to the level of general support for participation in European
cooperation, but in the middle; what is characteristic of Denmark is the
rather high percentage of dedicated opponents. However, the salient
question in Denmark’s European policy is no longer participation as such,
but the modalities of the Union. During the referendum campaign a
heatedly debated question was whether the Amsterdam Treaty meant “more
Union”. On this issue of the borderline between national and Union
competences, Danes tend to have conservative views, cf. Table 2, which
renders some results from the time of the 1992 and 1993 referendum
campaigns.
Table 2. Scope of European Union. Percentage of Danish voters in favour of
inclusion of issues under EC competence
Issue Areas May 1992 June 1992 May 1993
Abolition of trade barrier and customs
obstacles
61 69 65
The internal market 59 74 71
Economic and Monetary Union 45 53 42
Equalization of economic differences between
EC countries
42 49 43
Common foreign policy 38 38 37
Common defence policy 37 30 34
Single currency 35 34 23
Labour market policy - ‘the social dimension’ 33 39 41
Creation of the United States of Europe 23 19 21
Common citizenship 15 13 14
Sources:Karen Siune, Palle Svensson and Ole Tonsgaard, - det blev et nej (Aarhus: Forlaget Politica, 1992), p.
74, and Palle Svensson, ‘The Danish Yes to Maastricht and Edinburgh. The EC Referendum of May
1993’, Scandinavian Political Studies, No. 1, 1994.
In order to explain this reserve towards “the Union”, one has to refer to
history and political culture. During the Amsterdam campaign most anti-
Union feelings were directed towards Schengen. Underneath was a clear,
though not openly articulated anti-German tone. Opening the border toNikolaj Petersen
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Germany appears a major problem, while nobody seems to care about the
fact that Denmark has had open borders with Sweden and Norway for more
than 40 years under the Nordic Passport Union. This reflects a troubled
historical relationship with Germany, which has given Danish nationalism
a special anti-German twinge.
Furthermore, Denmark shares the German understanding of the nation as
built upon a common ethnic ancestry and a common history; in one
particular characterization the Danes have been called a tribe with close
and intimate relations between members of the tribe, but negative relations
towards other tribes, the Nordic tribes perhaps excepted.
23 This means that
foreigners are generally well treated in Denmark, but they are not allowed
really to integrate, to become one of “us”. This attitude makes intimate and
binding cooperation with other “tribes” dubious, because it may affect the
national identity.
Another important fact is, that Denmark is not a failed or troubled nation-
state as certain other EU countries. Denmark reacted to the world crisis in
the 1930’s and the Cold War by building up a strong welfare state on a
national basis. In this process Denmark became a self-contained state with
strong democratic institutions, with a well-functioning, though expensive
welfare state and with a modern economy. Danes are therefore generally
well satisfied with their country which they tend to view as more
democratic and more socially balanced than other European states. Support
for the national welfare state is not only strong among the less privileged
parts of the population, but also in the middle classes. And among those
who are closely tied to the welfare state as clients or as employees there is
an instinctive fear that the EU - if the union process is allowed to continue -
may undermine the special Danish welfare system by reducing
entitlements, etc.
                                        
23 Former British Ambassador to Denmark Sir James Mellon in 1992, quoted in Peter
Gundelach, “Danskernes særpræg”, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1992,
Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1993, pp. 133-145. On the Nordic
aspect, see Johnny N. Laursen & Thorsten B. Olesen, A Nordic Alternative to
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This may sound, as if Denmark is an extremely closed and self-centered
country. This is not the case, though. Despite recent tightenings, Denmark
still has a fairly liberal immigration policy; Denmark is actively involved in
enlarging the Western institutions to the east; and there is a broad
consensus that Denmark should be among those countries which provide
most aid for the third world. In the EU, Denmark is generally recognized as
a constructive and loyal partner in day-to-day work.
After these general comments on why the Danes have problems with the
Union process, a few remarks on the result of the recent referendum may
be in order. However, it must emphasized that in the immediate aftermath
of the referendum very little reliable data is available on who voted what
and why. However, results from previous referenda may give good
indications, as voting patterns are fairly stable.
First, there is an important regional dimension to Danish EU voting, cf.
Table 1.
Denmark is divided into 17 major constituencies, which (except in the
Copenhagen area) are identical with the basic administrative “county” unit.
As the Table demonstrates there are significant differences between the
Copenhagen area, which has never voted “yes” in any EU referendum since
1972, and the rest of the country, which usually has a “yes” majority. The
“yes” vote is also stronger in Jutland than in the island part of Denmark.
This regional pattern is diametrically different from the other Nordic
countries, where support for the European Union is concentrated in the
metropolitan areas (the “center”), while the rest of the country (the
“periphery”) votes no. The reason for this particular Danish pattern is
probably that agriculture has traditionally been strongly pro-EU, while
workers have been sceptical.
The most interesting aspect of the recent referendum is not, however, that
the traditional regional pattern still obtains, but rather that it has weakened
considerably. While the “yes” vote dropped 2-3 per cent in the rest of the
country between 1993 and 1998, the “yes” vote rose in Copenhagen by 4.5
percent; in fact, for the first time in 25 years one Copenhagen metropolitan
district (West) returned a “yes” majority. On the other hand, supportNikolaj Petersen
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weakened in peripheral areas, such as Vestsjælland, Storstrøm and
Ringkøbing; a specially interesting result came from Southern Jutland
(Nordschleswig), which usually is very pro-EU; this time, support dropped
by 4.4 per cent, probably due to anxiety about Schengen and the prospect
of an open border to Germany.
There are also important demographic cleavages in the Danish population
over the EU, cf. Table 3, which represents poll data collected on
referendum day .
Table 3. The Amsterdam Treaty and Demographic Indicators (“yes” vote”)*
Sex Men 58 %
Women 54 %
Age 18-29 55 %
30-39 50 %
40-49 52 %
50-59 58 %
60-69 58 %
70 + 68 %
*) Data in this table was collected by Gallup Research Institute on referendum day, May 28, 1998. As the
total poll over-estimated the “yes” vote by 1.8 percentage points, the values in this table should be
reduced by 1-2 percentage points. The total sample was 1.919 persons.
Sources:Gallup Research Institute & Berlingske Tidende, May 29, 1998.
First, there is a certain difference, 4 percentage points, between men’s and
women’s votes, even though it was significantly reduced compared to 1992
and 1993, when the difference was 10 and 6 percentage points,
respectively. Such differences probably reflect the different working
experiences of men and women. Women tend to be employed in the public
sector, mostly in low to medium functions and concentrated in the so-called
caring professions, i.e. nursing, teaching, etc. These are professions with
little concrete contact with the European Union but closely associated with
the national welfare state; fears of the fate of the welfare system in a
broader European context are therefore easily raised.
Age differences also play a role. The least positive groups are the 30-50
year olds, while young and people above 50 are more positive. It isThe Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam
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tempting to see the scepticism of the middle group as a reflection of the
1968 revolution.
Data from 1992/93 also shows some co-variation between education and
pro-EU attitudes, with highly educated persons being the most pro-EU.
24
This pattern is relatively new as there used to be a prenounced EC
scepticism among academics and intellectuals until a decade ago. However,
this scepticism has been on the vane since then, and during the referendum
campaign artists, authors and intellectuals openly campaigned for a “yes”;
this would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. Euro-scepticism is
now clearly associated with the less privileged segments of the Danish
population.
Differences between professions are significant, as well. General (less
skilled) workers tend to be the most sceptical professional group. Skilled
workers are less sceptical than unskilled workers, and functionaries and
civil servants are even more pro-EU. The most pro-EU group is the group
of self-employed which also emcompasses the large group of independent
farmers. Corresponding to these figures, one also finds clear income
differentials between supporters and opponents of the European Union.
25
Finally, the party correlates of attitudes towards the European Union are
very significant, cf. Table 4.
Table 4. The Amsterdam Treaty and Party vote 1998 (“yes” vote)
Socialist People’s Party 19 %
Social Democrats 55 %
Social Liberals 70 %
Center Democrats 68 %
Conservatives 80 %
Liberals 83 %
Danish People’s Party 12 %
Sources:Gallup Research Institute & Berlingske Tidende, May 29, 1998.
                                        
24 See Hans Jørgen Nielsen, EF på valg, Copenhagen: Columbus, 1993, p. 57 & 59.
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There is a clear anti-EU majority among supporters of the leftist parties,
who make up about 10 per cent of the electorate. On referendum day some
81 per cent of the People’s Socialists voted against Amsterdam, which
places this party squarely in the “no” camp. On the right, which also covers
about 10 per cent of the electorate, there is also a heavy “no” percentage,
with 88 per cent of the Danish People’s Party voters voting against.
In between these groups are the pro-European parties, who between
themselves gather about 80 per cent in general elections, but some of which
have serious difficulties in persuading their voters about the party line on
the European Union. This time some 17 per cent of the Liberals and some
20 per cent of the Conservatives voted against the party line, as against
only 11 and 14 per cent in 1993.
26 This indicates that scepticism towards
the Union has grown among normally pro-European voters on the center-
right.
Traditionally, the Social Democratic Party has serious problems with its
rank and file. In 1992 two-thirds voted against Maastricht, and even in
1992 about half the voters rejected Maastricht-cum-Edinburgh. This time
the party apparently succeeded in having a majority vote for the Treaty,
namely 56 per cent. Even if this figure should probably be lowered by
about two percentage points, it indicates a shift among the voters, which
may very well be due to the extraordinary efforts to secure a “yes” by
Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Even so, the party obviously
continues to have a major problem with the European Union.
Denmark’s European Policy after the Referendum
On the basis of the referendum, Denmark can now deposit its ratification of
Amsterdam. The result obviously gives the Danish Government increased
freedom of movement in European politics. However, this should not be
exaggerated. 45 percent of the voters voted against Amsterdam, and one of
the Prime Minister’s first comment to the result was that the losing side,
                                        
26 Ibid., Table 16, p. 55. In 1992 11 per cent of the Liberals and 21 per cent of the
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with its anxieties and concerns, would not be forgotten. He also vowed that
Danish EU policy would continue to be in the interest of ordinary people,
not the “high and mighty”. Thus the policy goals of the last few years are
likely to be continued, i.e. a combination of policies reflect the need to
close the gap between the Union and ordinary people with an ambitious
enlargement policy. Several politicians, including the Prime Minister, also
expressed their expectation (and certainly also their hope) that the tempo of
integration would decrease with enlargement. Danish politicians will
therefore continue to have one eye in the rear-view mirror, when driving on
the European highway.
In the aftermath of the referendum the question of future referenda has
repeatedly been raised. There is a broad understanding, at least on the pro-
EU side, that there should be fewer referenda in the future. The Danish
Government can therefore be expected to be reticent with respect to major
treaty revisions in the near future, which - by involving transfer of
sovereignty - would trigger another referendum. Likewise, it seems safe to
predict that the Danish Edinburgh exemptions will not be put to the test in
referenda in the near future - and probably not before the Euro is a physical
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